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Abstract:  Suppose an inquiring group wants to let a certain view stand as the group's view. 
But there’s a problem: the individuals in that group do not initially all agree with one 
another about what the correct view is. What should the group do, given that it wants to 
settle on a single answer, in the face of this kind of intragroup disagreement? Should the 
group members deliberate and exchange evidence and then take a vote? Or, given the well-
known ways that evidence exchange can go wrong, e.g., by exacerbating pre-existing 
biases, compromising the independence of individual judgments, etc., should the group 
simply take a vote without deliberating at all? While this question has multiple dimensions 
to it—including ethical and political dimensions—we approach the question through an 
epistemological lens.  In particular, we investigate to what extent it is epistemically 
advantageous and disadvantageous that groups whose members disagree over some issue 
use deliberation in comparison to voting as a way to reach collective agreements. Extant 
approaches in the literature to this ‘deliberation versus voting’ comparison typically 
assume there is some univocal answer as to which group strategy is best, epistemically. 
We think this assumption is mistaken. We approach the deliberation versus voting question 
from a pluralist perspective, in that we hold that a group’s collective endeavor to solve an 
internal dispute can be aimed at different, albeit not necessarily incompatible, epistemic 
goals, namely the goals of truth, evidence, understanding, and epistemic justice. Different 
answers to our guiding question, we show, correspond with different epistemic goals. We 
conclude by exploring several ways to mitigate the potential epistemic disadvantages of 
solving intragroup disagreement by means of deliberation in relation to each epistemic 
goal. 
 
1 Setting the stage: deliberative versus non-deliberative agreement following intragroup 
disagreement  
Many disagreements take place in group settings. Over the years, religious groups (e.g., Christians) 
have internally disputed topics they consider significant (e.g., the real presence of Christ in the 
Eucharist). More often than not, political parties (e.g., the Tories) go through internal divisions over 
issues of societal importance (e.g., a no-deal Brexit). A brief look at the history of science reveals how 
scientists (e.g., physicists) disagree over factual issues in their fields (e.g., the Copenhagen vs. the many-
worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics). More mundanely, disputes over practical matters are the 
order of the day in many families.  On occasions, such internal disagreements end up badly, with a split 
in the relevant group or a punishment for the less influential. Sometimes, however, they result in a 
consensus1 or an agreement of sorts to take a particular course of action or to let some view stand as the 
group’s view.2 It is this latter kind of intragroup disagreement we are interested in: the one that gets 
resolved. 
How members of a group internally disagree matters for many reasons, not only for the stability 
or survival of the group but also epistemically. In general, there are two epistemically significant ways 
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in which intragroup disagreement can be resolved, i.e., in which members of a divided group can come 
to agree to let a certain view stand as the group's view:  (i) they can deliberate and/or (ii) take a vote.  
In this chapter, we are interested in investigating the epistemic significance that the key 
difference between deliberative and voting procedures has for the resolution of intragroup 
disagreement: namely, the fact that only deliberation necessarily requires that group members 
communicate with each other and, more specifically, the fact that, by doing so, they exchange their 
evidence. Thus, the paper aims to assess, in general, the epistemic significance that such an exchange 
(or lack thereof) has for the resolution of intragroup disagreement.             
This is of course not to say that deliberation and voting are mutually exclusive mechanisms for 
groups to resolve their internal disputes. In practice, groups settle their disagreements by mixed methods 
of decision-making, i.e., methods that both involve deliberating and voting—as is, for instance, the 
mixed method for judging articles of impeachment in the United States House of Representatives. 
 That said, to better pin down the epistemic significance of each, it is best to keep them apart, 
at least theoretically. Thus, the kind of cases we will mainly focus on (whether real or ideal) have the 
following structures: 
 
Deliberative cases of intragroup disagreement: Some operative members3 of group G hold 
p and some not-p at t1; at t2, G’s operative members deliberate among themselves (i.e., they 
exchange reasons, evidence, arguments, and so on) with an eye towards settling whether p or 
else not-p should stand as G’s view; at t3, as a result of this process, they settle on either p or 
not-p. 
 
Non-deliberative cases of intragroup disagreement: Some operative members of G hold p 
and some not-p at t1; at t2, G’s operative members aggregate their views by taking a vote given 
some voting rule (e.g., majority rule), absent any communication among each other, with an 
eye towards settling whether p or else not-p should stand as G’s view; at t3, as a result of this 
process, they settle on either p or not-p.4 
 
Some clarifications are in order. First, at t2, both in the case of deliberation and voting, members 
who initially believed that p should stand as G’s view may change their opinion, and vice versa. Second, 
we leave unspecified the number of group members that respectively hold p and not-p to make it 
compatible with several possibilities—as we will see, this factor marks a distinction in terms of 
reliability between deliberation and voting. Third, lack of communication among group members in the 
case of voting is compatible with there being common knowledge (perhaps implicit) of the existence of 
an internal disagreement or of the fact that it is to be solved by taking a vote.    
Finally, certain cases will not be our main focus. Quite often, members of a group settle on a 
collective view pursuing non-epistemic goals—regardless of whether this collective agreement is 
reached by deliberation or vote. For example, the board of directors of a pharmaceutical company might 
settle on the view that a newly marketed drug is not the cause of the death of many, even if they know 
it, to prevent huge financial losses. A government might systematically deny that the country’s secret 
services have been used for morally contentious surveillance activities, even if known to be true, to 
prevent protests and media pressure. A religious organization might conceal criminal activities by its 
members—and thus uphold the collective view that such activities never happened—to avoid criminal 
charges and loss of reputation. 
The reason we won't focus on such cases is that deliberative and voting procedures have little 
or no epistemic value when aimed at non-epistemic goals.5 Instead, the kind of cases we are interested 
in are cases of intragroup disagreement in which members of a group reach a collective agreement 
pursuing epistemic goals.6 Although this certainly reduces the scope of our inquiry, by idealizing our 
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focus in this way we will be in a better position to rule out pragmatic noise when answering the two key 
epistemological questions of the paper.7 For ease of reference, call these the resolution question and the 
deliberation question.  
Resolution question: What is the most epistemically appropriate way to resolve intragroup 
disagreement: by means of deliberation or by taking a vote? More specifically, to what extent 
is it epistemically advantageous and disadvantageous that group members exchange evidence 
when it comes to reaching a collective agreement? 
Deliberation question: Which conditions should deliberative disagreement comply with to be 
epistemically appropriate? More specifically, what it would take to overcome, or at least 
mitigate, the epistemic disadvantages of resolving intragroup disagreement by means of 
deliberation? 
Our methodological approach to answering these questions is based on a simple working assumption: 
a group’s collective endeavor to solve an internal dispute can be aimed at different (albeit not 
necessarily incompatible) epistemic goals. More carefully:  
Assumption: Possibly, for two epistemic goals, E and E*, and for two groups, G and G*, 
members of G would let p or else not-p stand as the G’s view only if the collectively accepted 
view has epistemic property E and members of G* would let p or else not-p stand as  G*’s view 
only if the collectively accepted view has epistemic property E*.   
With this assumption in place, each epistemic goal can be interpreted as providing a particular 
standard for assessing the epistemic significance of deliberating and voting in the resolution of 
intragroup disagreement. More specifically, the way we propose to assess this epistemic significance is 
in terms of goal-conduciveness: for each goal, we can assess to what extent the fact that group members 
exchange (or refrain from doing so) reasons and evidence are conducive to it. 
The following are four salient candidate epistemic goals we will consider, albeit they are not 
exhaustive (see fn. 9). For any group G in which some operative members hold p and some hold not-p, 
in trying to settle whether p or else not-p should stand as G’s view by means of method M, members of 
G would let p or else not-p stand as the group’s view only if:  
1. Truth: the collectively accepted view is true. 
2. Evidence: the collectively accepted view is better supported by the best evidence individually 
possessed by group members than the opposite view. 
3. Understanding: the collectively accepted view leads to more understanding than the opposite 
view.   
4. Epistemic justice: the fact that G’s members let such a view stand as G’s view does not wrong 
any member specifically in her capacity as an epistemic subject (e.g., as a giver of knowledge, 
in her capacity for social understanding, and so on) or any other person outside the group in 
that capacity.8 9 
Before assessing each epistemic goal, a final methodological caveat is in order. Our approach to the 
epistemic significance of deliberation and voting in terms of goal-conduciveness does not entail that 
the different epistemic goals are incompatible with each other, nor does it imply any stance on a number 
of debates, including (i) whether the relevant goals are finally or instrumentally valuable (or 
fundamentally or derivatively) in the case of collectives (cf., Goldman 1999; Fallis & Mathiesen 2013); 
or (ii) whether deliberation has a constitutive epistemic aim in terms of one of these goals; (iii) or 
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whether deliberation has procedural in addition to instrumental epistemic value (cf., Peter 2013). Our 
results might of course be relevant to these debates, but we stay neutral on them.10 
 Here is the plan. In §2, we address the truth goal, explain what the different kinds of evidence 
involved in deliberation are and how they bear on the individual reliability of deliberators; compare the 
collective reliabilities of deliberation and voting drawing on social choice theory, and show how 
complex it is to give a straightforward answer to the question of whether deliberation is reliable due to, 
among other things, the existence of several reliability-undermining group phenomena—which are 
widely investigated in social psychology. In §3, we explain why it shouldn’t be assumed that 
deliberation always achieves optimal results, nor that voting always produces suboptimal outcomes vis-
à-vis the goal of evidence. In §4, we offer two interpretations of the understanding goal and argue that 
on both interpretations deliberation outperforms mere voting. In §5, we argue that voting is more 
efficacious than deliberation with respect to the goal of epistemic justice. In §6, we propose several 
ways to mitigate the potential epistemic disadvantages of solving intragroup disagreement by means of 
deliberation in relation to each epistemic goal.       
2 Assessing for truth  
As we have seen, in settling for a collective view, groups may pursue non-epistemic goals (e.g., 
preventing financial losses), but they sometimes pursue epistemic goals. One example of an 
epistemically respectable goal, if not the most fundamental epistemic goal,11 is truth.  
In scientific disagreement, for example, members of a research group that internally disagree 
over some factual issue would not let a view stand as the group’s view unless they considered it true, 
or at least, more likely to be true than any competitor view. In a quiz show, members of a divided team 
would not let an answer stand as the team’s answer unless they considered it correct (or likely to be 
correct). Thus, for any given method that members of a divided group may use to reach a collective 
agreement, we can assess its epistemic propriety in terms of how conducive towards truth this method 
is. Crucially, the reliability of deliberative and voting methods depends on the kind of individual and 
collective conditions under which they are employed. Fortunately, these conditions have been widely 
investigated in disciplines such as social psychology and social choice theory. That being so, we will 
review some of their results (with an eye on truth as the relevant epistemic standard) so as to provide 
an answer to the resolution question on a safe theoretical and empirical ground.  
Before that, it is worth pointing out an epistemic difference concerning the reliability of 
deliberative and voting procedures in general. This will allow us to subsume some relevant results of 
the aforementioned disciplines under a broader epistemological framework. Consider, first, the 
following general idea: the reliability of a group in letting only a view that is true stand as the collective 
view is to some extent premised upon the reliability of individual group members in choosing the right 
view both in the case of deliberation and voting.  
To see this, consider a group (e.g. a flat Earth society) such that all members are utterly 
unreliable (e.g., almost always, they get things wrong) regarding the question of whether p (e.g. whether 
Earth is flat or spherical). Suppose that this kind of group internally disagrees on whether p or else not-
p should stand as the group’s view. Even if all members aim at settling on the true view, most will end 
up defending the false view because of their utter unreliability, whereas those who unlikely end up 
upholding the right view, will do it by luck. In such a situation, it doesn't matter whether the group 
deliberates or takes a vote: whatever the procedure for settling their internal disagreement, it will be an 
unreliable one. Therefore, group members need to be individually reliable to a minimum degree for 
them to reliably reach a correct collective agreement as a group—in §2.2, we will see what the minimum 
required degree of individual reliability is according to social choice theory.  
Nonetheless, while the reliability of a group in letting only a view that is true stand as the 
collective view is to some extent premised upon the reliability of individual group members both in the 
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case of deliberation and voting, individual reliability is fixed differently in deliberative and non-
deliberative cases. The reason, as we will argue next, has to do with the fact that the former involve 
different kinds of evidence besides private evidence and hence different individual competences are 
required to evaluate them (this will also have a bearing on our discussion in §3).  
2.1 Individual reliability 
In non-deliberative cases (at least as we have conceived them), the only evidence that group members 
use to establish which of the two options in a given dispute (p and not-p) is true (and therefore which 
one is the one that the group should uphold) is their own private evidence. In deliberative cases, by 
contrast, group members possess not only private evidence, but they are also exposed to shared 
evidence—i.e. evidence bearing on p/not-p shared by other group members during deliberation. In 
addition, as a consequence of this sharing process, they are also exposed to evidence about the 
distribution of opinions within the group, or social evidence for short—i.e. evidence that n number of 
group members are in agreement and m number in disagreement with one.  
Thus, one plausible idea is that, for any given group member, her overall individual reliability 
concerning the disputed matter will be determined by how reliable she is in accurately judging to what 
extent each kind of evidence supports p or not-p. Interestingly, precisely because these are different 
kinds of evidence, the degree of reliability in assessing them need not coincide, hence the divergence 
with non-deliberative cases. Let's consider each in turn. 
First, group members can be more or less reliable at seeing how relevant to the disputed matter 
their private evidence is, and on how much it supports or counts against the views in conflict. If, for 
instance, a group member's private evidence is misleading evidence for p because, say, it comes from a 
seemingly trustworthy but ultimately unreliable source, she will hardly assess in a reliable fashion that 
her evidence does not actually count in favor of p. Suppose that voting is the relevant procedure for 
resolving intragroup disagreement in a given case. In the difficult cases of misleading evidence just 
mentioned—as well as in cases where a group member has no evidence whatsoever—not voting for 
either option might be the best action to avoid collective error. 
When it comes to shared evidence, matters are more complex. When group members put their 
private evidence on the table during deliberation, all involved members are exposed to two different 
things: (i) information that may back up, conflict, be redundant with or even irrelevant to their private 
evidence, and (ii) judgments from other group members to the effect that the shared information 
supports p or else not-p to such-and-such degree. Accordingly, and as in the case of private evidence, a 
group member can be more or less reliable at assessing to what extent the information provided by other 
members is relevant and corroborative of p or of not-p, and this can be done by, among other things, 
correctly assessing to what extent those other members are competent information-gatherers. 
Interestingly, as some have noted (e.g. Elga 2010; Weatherson 2013; Asunta-Eder [this volume]), being 
competent at acquiring evidence is independent from being competent at correctly judging the 
confirmational import of the evidence. Thus, on top of being more or less reliable at assessing the 
evidence shared during deliberation, group members can be more or less reliable at assessing to what 
extent their fellow members' assessments of such shared evidence are accurate.  
The last kind of evidence involved in deliberative cases, social evidence, is somehow different, 
as it does not directly bear on the question of whether p. As we have defined it, social evidence is 
evidence about, specifically, the distribution of opinions within the group, i.e., evidence about how 
many group members believe that p (or else not-p) should stand as the group's view because p (or else 
not-p) is true. Interestingly, social evidence can have a defeating effect on its own even if it does not 
directly bear on the question of whether p, and namely even if it carries no more information than that 
of assertions of the type "I think that p should stand as the group's view".  
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To see this, suppose that you have conclusive private evidence for the truth of p and that on that 
basis you believe that p should stand as the group's view. Furthermore, suppose that you are the only 
person in your group in possession of evidence that is relevant to the disputed matter. You share your 
evidence with your fellow members, which you regard as your epistemic peers. Suppose, next, that no 
one is moved and all of them (e.g., 999 members), except for you, individually assert “I believe that 
not-p should stand as the group’s view because not-p is true". Many in the epistemological literature on 
disagreement agree that you should reduce your confidence in your belief simply because of being 
exposed to social evidence to the effect that a majority is in disagreement with you.12 Furthermore, this 
defeating effect may occur even if private evidence directly bearing on p/not-p has not been put on the 
table yet.13 
Turning to reliability, the kind of competence required to judge whether the social evidence 
available in the group is misleading or on the right track is a competence to judge whether the other 
group members are being sincere in asserting things such as “I believe that p should stand as the group's 
view". Suppose that, during deliberation, someone in your group asserts that. The questions you should 
ask yourself, qua group member, are like these: Is this person being sincere? Does she really care about 
the truth? Or is she making that assertion for strategic or pragmatic reasons? If one can answer these 
kinds of questions correctly for all (or at least many) group members, one is reliable at processing the 
group's available social evidence.14 By contrast, if one conciliates with the majority for a non-epistemic 
reason such as social comparison (e.g., to maintain a socially favorable position within the group), one 
is not reliable at processing the group’s social evidence.15  
Which of these different bodies of evidence (i.e., private, shared or social) and which of the 
corresponding degrees of reliability in processing them should have a greater weight in the overall 
individual reliability of a given group member is a question whose answer hangs to a great extent on 
the correctness of the different views of the epistemology of disagreement. In general, steadfast 
theorists will be more inclined to assign a greater weight to the group members’ assessments of their 
own private evidence (or even of the shared evidence), whereas conciliationists will lean in the direction 
of giving a greater significance to the judgments of other group members and to the distribution of 
opinions within the group.16 
To summarize the discussion so far, we’ve seen that there is a significant difference between 
how individual reliability is fixed in deliberative and non-deliberative cases of intragroup disagreement. 
This difference has to do with the fact that in non-deliberative cases group members only need to 
evaluate the confirmational import of their own private evidence to choose between the true and the 
false collective view. In deliberative cases, by contrast, group members need to process, besides their 
private evidence, the evidence shared by others as well as the available evidence about the distribution 
of opinions within the group, which can have a defeating effect by itself. In such deliberative cases, 
however, it is an open question which kind of evidence should carry more weight in fixing the individual 
reliability of group members, or what the interplay between these three types of evidence might be. 
2.2 Group reliability 
One question we can ask concerning the reliability of deliberative and voting procedures is how reliable 
individual members of a group undergoing an internal dispute need be in order for one such procedure 
to reliably lead the group to settle on the true view. The results of social choice theory become useful 
on this score. 
Let’s consider voting first. In general, political scientists assess voting rules in terms of fairness 
criteria, i.e., how sensitive they are to all of the voter’s opinions and preferences in the right way (Pacuit 
2019). However, interestingly for our epistemological purposes, they can also be assessed in terms of 
how well they track the truth, i.e., in terms of how much the resulting collective view approximates it 
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(List 2013; Pacuit 2019). A voting rule that is often referred to as a collective truth-tracking device in 
the two-option case (the one we are concerned with) is majority rule (see, e.g., List & Goodin 2001). 
As it is well-known, one prominent argument for adopting majority rule comes from the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT), which maintains that, given two possible positions p and not-p with 
respect to a given topic (e.g., a verdict, a diagnosis, a factual issue), where only one of the options is 
correct given some standard (in our case, truth), the probability that a majority votes for the correct 
option increases and converges to one as the size of the group grows. Crucially, CJT is premised upon 
two conditions: (i) that the probability (viz. reliability) that each group member identifies the correct 
position is greater than 0.5 and the same for all voters (voter competence condition);  and (ii)  that all 
correct votes are mutually independent conditional on the truth,17 which is either p or not-p (voter 
independence condition).18  
Whether or not majority rule reliably yields epistemically appropriate results (true or accurate 
group agreements) crucially depends on the voter competence and independence conditions being met. 
But this seldom happens. For instance, factors that have been cited as leading to correlated votes include 
opinion leaders, schools of thought, communication among voters or common information (cf., e.g.,  
Ladha 1992). Moreover, as Dietrich and Spiekermann (2020) point out, any common cause of votes is 
a potential source of dependence, including non-evidential (e.g., situational) factors such as distracting 
heat.19  
Lack of independence has implications not only for whether or not CJT applies to a group that 
aims to resolve an internal dispute by taking a vote according to majority rule, but also for how the 
nature of such a disagreement should be conceived. After all, if the votes of every member in the two 
disagreeing subgroups are correlated, intragroup disagreement comes down to a one-to-one 
disagreement situation, as there would be two sets of mutually dependent votes: those for p and those 
for not-p. This is epistemically significant. For one epistemic benefit of CJT is that the larger the group, 
the better at tracking the truth it is. Therefore, if all votes are correlated in the two disagreeing 
subgroups, the size of the group no longer has a bearing on its reliability.     
Turning to voter competence, multiple specific factors can bear on the individual reliability of 
voters. From a general epistemological point of view, the quality of their private evidence is probably 
the most significant factor. But note that voter reliability can be low even when the evidence privately 
possessed is good evidence. For the probability that a voter correctly judges that her good evidence is 
supportive of p rather than not-p is independent of the epistemic goodness of the evidence (e.g., 
someone with conclusive private evidence might fail to notice that the evidence is conclusive because 
of not being sufficiently attentive). Conversely, a voter with misleading evidence might uncritically 
follow her evidence, thus making it unlikely that she votes for the correct view. Finally, voters can also 
be unlikely to vote for the right view when they possess no evidence whatsoever (e.g., by casting their 
votes for p or not-p merely on the basis of the results of tossing coins that unbeknownst to them are 
independently biased in favor of the false view). Interestingly, all this can happen while all group 
members vote with the aim of choosing the correct view. 
Lack of voter competence bears on the epistemic appropriateness of majority vote as a way of 
solving a group’s internal dispute. One thing that the literature on CJT shows is that when the votes are 
independent but the competence of all voters is lower than 0.5 and the same for all, or when the average 
judgmental competence of voters in the group is lower than 0.5 (cf., e.g., Grofmam et al. 1983), the 
probability that a majority votes for the correct option increases and converges to 0 as the size of the 
group grows. So majority rule can be an epistemically inappropriate procedure for solving intragroup 
disagreement after all. 
Of course, the literature is filled with jury theorems that relax the independence (Ladha 1992, 
Dietrich and List 2004, and Dietrich and Spiekermann 2013; Goodin and Spiekermann 2018) and the 
competence (e.g. Boland, P.J. 1989; Grofmam et al. 1983) conditions while still serving as truth-
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tracking devices, and hence as epistemically appropriate ways to resolve intragroup disagreement, at 
least in the case of large groups.20 But, in general, voters need to be individually reliable to a sufficient 
degree, where in most cases this means being better than random.21 
For some internal disputes, when individual reliability is an issue, groups can opt for some sort 
of proxy voting system that allows delegation of the votes to the most competent or well-informed in 
the group, or to weighted majority rules (e.g., expert rules) that assign different weights to different 
competence distributions (e.g., more weight to the votes of the most competent members). In general, 
for any competence distribution, there will be an optimal voting truth-tracking procedure for the group 
to solve its internal disagreement (for optimal voting rules see, e.g., Nitzan & Paroush 1982; Gradstein 
& Nitzan 1986; Dietrich 2006).  
Beyond specific voting rules groups might use to resolve their internal disputes, one question 
we can ask is this: does communication and evidence sharing among group members represent a 
significant epistemic advantage over members simply taking a vote on the basis of her private evidence? 
What are the epistemic benefits and drawbacks of deliberation in general vis-à-vis the goal of reaching 
a true collective agreement? 
One way to answer these questions is to offer a formal analysis of deliberation and compare it 
to voting procedures. Hartmann and Rafiee Rad (2018) do precisely this and show that deliberation is 
truth-conducive in a similar way as majority voting as per CJT.  It is worth considering their proposed 
Bayesian model of deliberation, not only because its results are relevant to the subject matter, but also 
because it will serve to illustrate the many complexities that communication among group members 
may give rise to and, therefore, that any formal model of deliberation might need to incorporate if 
deliberation is to be compared to voting in a realistic way. 
Hartmann and Rafiee Rad’s Bayesian model of deliberation is based on several assumptions. 
First, all evidence is put on the table before deliberation (i.e., no extra evidence shows up during 
deliberation, so all evidence is shared evidence). Second, group members are assigned a first-order 
reliability value that measures how correctly they judge the disputed matter. Third, they are assigned a 
second-order reliability value that reflects how well they estimate the first-order reliability of the other 
group members. The latter is kept fixed during the course of deliberation, while the former may increase 
as members learn to better judge the reliability of other group members. In this way, deliberation, as 
they model it, consists in the following process:  
The group has to decide on the truth or falsity of a hypothesis H. Each group member assigns 
a certain probability to H. Then each group member casts a vote on the basis of this probability. 
Then each group member updates her probability on the basis of the votes of the other group 
members, weighted according to the estimated reliabilities (...). The procedure is iterated, and 
in each round the second order reliabilities are increased which leads to a more accurate 
estimation of the reliability of the votes of the other group members. After a number of rounds, 
this process converges (Hartmann & Rafiee Rad 2018: 1278) 
Their results show that the truth-tracking properties of deliberation are very similar to those of majority 
vote. As they summarize them: 
The deliberation process results in a consensus and correctly tracks the truth for groups of large 
size in the following cases: (i) homogeneous groups with a first order reliability greater than 
0.5 and with a high second order reliability (ii) inhomogeneous groups with average first order 
reliabilities above 0.5 and with a high (initial) second order reliability. In this sense the 
deliberation procedure manifests the same epistemic properties as the majority voting while 
adding the benefit of a group consensus (...) We furthermore provided simulation results that 
indicate that the deliberation procedure tracks the truth even in cases that do not fall under the 
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conditions stated in the Condorcet Jury Theorem for majority voting as well as for groups with 
low second order reliabilities (Hartmann & Rafiee Rad 2018: 1289) 
In sum, if Hartmann and Rafiee Rad are right, although majority vote may be more easily implemented 
as a procedure for solving intragroup disagreement in the case of large groups, deliberating vis-à-vis 
the goal of reaching true collective agreements is roughly as epistemically appropriate as voting by 
majority rule. This gives an answer to the resolution question. As we will see next, however, this answer 
is incomplete, since real-life deliberation cases may involve many complexities that make giving a 
general, straightforward answer to that question a complex matter.  
2.3 Deliberation in non-idealized conditions 
Formal models are surely a great approach to the question of whether deliberation or voting is the most 
reliable way to solve intragroup disagreement. But deliberation involves many complexities—not 
present in voting cases—that have a bearing on its reliability as a collective method for solving 
intragroup disagreement, and which can make it difficult to give a straightforward answer. To illustrate 
this, consider Hartmann and Rafiee Rad’s model again. As they acknowledge, in order to capture the 
reliability of more realistic deliberative situations, several assumptions of the model need to be relaxed, 
such as the assumption that the deliberators are independent, i.e., that the only cause for a group 
members’ verdict is the truth or falsity of the hypothesis in question—whereas other members’ verdicts 
are evidence for the truth or falsity of that hypothesis that don’t necessarily break such an independence. 
Indeed:  
(i) In real-life deliberation cases, the individual judgments of members of deliberating groups 
may not be independent from each other. 
Or the assumption that the first-order reliability of group members remains unchanged during 
deliberation. After all: 
(ii) In real-life deliberation cases, the probability that a given group member is right or wrong 
about the disputed matter may change along the deliberative process.  
Or the assumption that the first-order reliability of group members is independent from their second-
order reliability. However:  
(iii) In real-life deliberation cases, how well a group member estimates how reliable, concerning 
the disputed matter, other group members are may be influenced by the judgment of those other 
members. 
Other complications that a formal model of deliberation might need to incorporate to better reflect how 
deliberation compares to voting in real cases include the following. For instance, one crucial assumption 
of Hartmann and Rafiee Rad’s model is that there is full disclosure of the evidence among all group 
members before deliberation. But:  
(iv) In real-life deliberation cases, group members may gradually disclose their private evidence 
to other group members, and may not even disclose any evidence at all. 
This is relevant, because in so proceeding deliberating groups can and often times fall prey to shared 
information bias, a tendency to discuss shared evidence, i.e., evidence that most group members 
possess, in detriment to discussing potentially relevant evidence privately possessed by individual 
members or only shared by a few of them (cf., Stasser & Titus 1985). If group members have good 
private evidence but they do not draw on it during discussion—a situation that is often referred to as a 
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hidden profile—, the reliability of the deliberative process can be compromised. Several factors can 
help groups overcome shared information bias (see §3). Interestingly, the kind of groups we are 
concerned with—those whose goal is to find a correct answer—see this bias diminished by devoting 
more of their discussions to considering critical clues thus becoming more likely to adopt a correct view 
when relevant private information remains unshared (Stasser & Stewart 1992).  
Another crucial assumption of Hartmann and Rafiee Rad’s model is that deliberation proceeds 
in a series of iterations in which each group member first assigns a probability to the hypothesis in 
question, then casts a vote, and then each member updates her probability on the basis of the votes of 
other group members, weighted according to the estimated reliabilities. However: 
(v) In real-life deliberation cases, group members may discuss the relevant issue one or several 
times and then take one final single vote to decide which view should stand as the group’s view, 
or simply reach consensus without voting at all. 
Other complexities have to do with the different types of evidence distinguished in §2.1. For example, 
during deliberation group members put their private evidence on the table, which becomes shared 
evidence. The complication, as we have already pointed out, is that:      
(vi) In real-life deliberation cases, group members may need to assess two things: how good 
the evidence shared by other members is (e.g., by judging, among other things, how reliable 
those members are in gathering good evidence) and how good those other members’ 
assessments of their own shared evidence are (e.g., by judging how reliable they are in assessing 
the confirmation import of their evidence).  
This means that a more realistic model may need to include two measures of second-order reliability, 
instead of one (see Asunta-Eder, this volume, for this kind of approach).  
In addition, as we have also argued, social evidence—i.e., evidence about the distribution of 
opinions within the group—can have a defeating effect on its own (i.e., independent of the group’s 
shared evidence) even if it carries no information directly bearing on the question of whether p (like 
shared evidence does). Relatedly, the very distribution of the disagreement matters and, in particular, 
when the relevant intragroup disagreement is between a majority and a minority. This is illustrated by 
extensive research in social psychology on group conformity pressures, and in particular, on majority 
influence. For example, in a famous study by Sherif (1936), subjects were asked to perform a visual 
task. Subjects whose estimations diverged from those of the majority gradually converged to the latter 
after being exposed several times to the opinions of the majority. In later studies by Asch (e.g., 1952), 
the relevant visual task had an obvious correct answer and conformity to the majority was also observed 
(although to a lesser extent). Accordingly, it is plausible that: 
(vii) In real-life deliberation cases, group members who hold a different view to the one held 
by most members of the group may conform to the majority opinion by repeatedly being 
exposed to it. 
Judging whether a disagreeing majority is right or wrong might be a complex issue. In particular, to 
judge whether majority influence is epistemically appropriate, one needs to determine whether it is 
informational (i.e., due to the fact that there is more evidence supporting the relevant opinion) or 
normative (e.g., due to a desire to fit and avoid social exclusion). Incorporating a corresponding realistic 
measure of reliability in a formal model of deliberation might accordingly be a complex issue as  well. 
The issue is even more complex considering the fact that minorities also exert influence on 
majorities. For instance, Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux (1969) observed this kind of effect in a visual 
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task with an obvious correct answer when a minority of subjects gave consistent and unanimous answers 
that diverged from those of the majority. Thus:  
(viii) In real-life deliberation cases, group members who unanimously hold a different view to 
the one held by most members may make the latter conform to their opinions by consistently 
exposing it to them. 
The existence of minority dissent is not necessarily negative at the collective level. Quite the contrary: 
minority dissent previous to group discussion has been observed to improve the quality of the resulting 
collective judgments and decisions (e.g., Hightower & Sayeed 1996; Brodbeck et al. 2002; Schulz-
Hardt et al. 2006) 
Another specific condition widely investigated in social psychology that may affect the 
reliability of deliberation is the group polarization phenomenon (e.g., Stoner 1961; Burnstein & 
Vinokur 1977; Isenberg 1986):22  
(ix) In real-life deliberation cases, the individual members of like-minded groups may adopt, 
on average, more extreme views after group discussion than those held before deliberation. 
This means, for instance, that in an intragroup disagreement where most group members lean, on 
average, towards p and only a few towards not-p chances are that if group members discuss whether p 
or not-p should stand as the group’s view, the group’s average will more strongly lean towards p. This 
is a source of collective unreliability, at least in the cases where p is false. Thus, the initial distribution 
of opinions in a group featuring an internal disagreement matters for how reliable deliberation is in 
solving it. 
Finally, when it comes to the different kinds of evidence involved in deliberation, the most 
difficult issue to solve is this:  
(x) In real-life deliberation cases, it may be unclear what exactly the interplay between the 
different kinds of evidence (private, shared or social) is, and which one should play a more 
significant role in whether a group ends up adopting a true or else a false view following 
deliberation. 
As we noted in §2.1, it is an open question which of these three kinds of evidence should have a greater 
weight in fixing the reliability of individual deliberators. This question might be difficult to address 
with formalization or empirical research only, and further philosophical investigation is required. 
So where does this leave us? Is deliberation as appropriate as a method to solve intragroup 
disagreement vis-à-vis the truth goal as voting is when CJT-style theorems apply?  According to 
Hartmann and Rafiee Rad’s model, the answer is ‘yes’.  However, this answer to the resolution question, 
albeit on the right track, is not (as they also acknowledge) fully satisfactory: deliberating groups can be 
affected by a variety of factors that bear negatively (but also positively) on the reliability of deliberation. 
Some such factors that we have discussed are: (i) the interdependence between the judgments of group 
members; (ii) changes in their first-order reliability along the deliberative process; (iii) the first-order 
and second-order reliabilities of group members not being independent; (iv) shared information bias 
and hidden profile situations; (v) different modes of deliberating, such as several iterations of 
deliberation and voting, deliberation followed by a single final vote, or deliberation followed by 
consensus absent voting; (vi) the group members’ need to assess the epistemic quality of the evidence 
shared by others and of the judgments they make about such evidence; (vii) majority influence; (viii) 
minority influence; (ix) group polarization; and (x) the complex interplay between private, shared and 
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social evidence. If anything involves complexity, that is the question of whether deliberation is a truth-
conducive method for solving intragroup disagreement. 
3 Assessing for evidence  
Truth is not the end of the story, however. It is not unusual that members of a group featuring an internal 
disagreement are not merely interested in settling on a true collective view, but on a view that is 
supported by the best evidence individually possessed by them. Of course, the truth and evidence goals 
are not incompatible and are in fact oftentimes pursued simultaneously, so that members of a group 
would let a certain view stand as the group’s view only if it were true and supported by the best private 
evidence available in the group.  
However, the two goals are also independent from each other and cases of groups whose 
primary goal is not truth but evidential support are conceivable. For example, consider a group of high-
profile members of the Bush administration back in 2003 having a disagreement about the exact location 
of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. Even if all are aware or suspect that there are no 
WMDs, they might still be interested in collectively agreeing on the view that is supported by the best 
evidence privately possessed by them (such as the most credible military reports about the possible 
locations of WMDs). Or consider a tobacco company’s board of directors back in the ’50s having a 
disagreement on which kind of evidence provides the best epistemic justification against the (now 
proven) fact that there is a causal link between smoking and lung cancer. Each board member might be 
in possession of different bodies of evidence, such as different statements from physicians against that 
fact or different scientific reports to the effect that there is no conclusive scientific proof of a link 
between smoking and cancer. Even if all board members might individually suspect that smoking causes 
cancer, they might still be more interested in agreeing on a collective view that is false yet supported 
by their best private evidence than on a true collective view with worse or no intragroup evidential 
support.23 The motives of these groups might be non-epistemic—e.g., convincing the public opinion 
that Saddam Hussein has WMDs or that smoking is not causally linked to lung cancer—, but their goals, 
insofar as they prime evidential support, can be considered epistemic.24  
Thus, with the goal of evidence (not truth) in mind, we can ask: what method for solving 
intragroup disagreement is best vis-à-vis the evidence goal: deliberation or voting? At first sight, 
deliberation seems a better method for solving intragroup disagreement when a group is mainly seeking 
evidential support. After all, it is at the core of any deliberative process that group members 
communicate their opinions and share their evidence with other members. Thus, in ideal deliberative 
conditions, no collective decision is made or no collective view is adopted unless all members share 
their private evidence and everyone processes it.  
By contrast, not all voting rules seem well-suited to reach collective views that are supported 
by the best evidence privately possessed within the group. Consider majoritarian rules. Suppose that a 
group of physicians disagree about whether they should give treatment A or B to a patient. All except 
one believe that they should apply A. Their opinions are based on their own physical examination of 
the patient and their clinical judgment. By contrast, the only dissenter in the group is in possession of 
conclusive evidence for applying B (e.g., evidence from randomized clinical trials). Without prior 
deliberation (something admittedly rare for medical decisions), the group takes a vote and they 
collectively accept that they should apply treatment A. This view, however, is not supported by the best 
evidence privately possessed within the group: the dissenter’s evidence is discounted as a result of the 
voting procedure. 
Of course, this neither implies that deliberation always achieves optimal results, nor that voting 
always produces suboptimal outcomes vis-à-vis the goal of evidence. As the social choice theory 
literature shows, some voting rules are conducive to this goal. In addition, as the social psychology 
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literature demonstrates, deliberating groups often operate in non-ideal conditions that prevent them 
from exploiting the full potential of deliberation. 
Let's consider voting first. In a recent paper, Bozbay et al. (2014) propose a quota rule that aims 
to make correct collective decisions (or judgments) while being efficient in light of all the information 
privately possessed by group members. As Dietrich and List (2007: 392) explain, quota rules are 
judgment aggregation rules such that “a proposition is collectively accepted if and only if the number 
of individuals accepting it is greater than or equal to some threshold”. Bozbay et al. focus on cases in 
which groups need to settle on the correctness of two propositions, e.g., a jury on whether a contract 
was broken and whether it is legally valid, or a hiring committee on whether a candidate is good at 
research and good at teaching. Their proposed quota rule for these simple preferences (i.e., choosing 
between a correct and an incorrect decision, making a right or a wrong judgment) is based on the idea 
that for any of these propositions to be more probably true than false given all information, at least a 
number of group members above a certain threshold—which they define formally—need to possess 
evidence for that proposition. This rule, they argue, effectively uses all the private evidence available 
in the group assuming that group members aim for correct decisions and judgments. In sum, even if 
majoritarian rules are not appropriate for the goal of evidence, voting cannot be discarded out of hand 
as a procedure for solving intragroup disagreement with the aim of settling on an evidentially well-
supported collective view. 
Let’s consider deliberation now. While it is true that there are voting rules that are appropriate 
for the goal of evidence, it is also true that deliberation may not be conducive to it. As we have seen, 
deliberating groups often fall prey to shared information bias—recall: the tendency to discuss evidence 
that most members possess in detriment to discussing potentially relevant evidence privately possessed 
by individual group members or only shared by a few of them. When a group undergoes this kind of 
bias and the unshared evidence is the best or at least relevant evidence (a hidden profile situation), 
solving an internal dispute by deliberating may not be more conducive to the evidence goal than voting 
by majoritarian rules.  
We have also seen that groups that aim to find a correct answer (at the truth goal), see this bias 
diminished because they devote more discussion time to consider critical clues (Stasser & Stewart 
1992). Other factors that help reduce shared information bias include the involvement of team leaders 
(Larson et al. 1996) as well as of members with experience in the subject matter (Wittenbaum 1998)—
they pay more attention to unshared information—, low time pressure or having access to sheets that 
either indicate which pieces of information are shared and unshared—rather than discussing the relevant 
issue from memory—(Bowman & Wittenbaum 2012). However, the most relevant factor in the context 
of intragroup disagreement is, precisely, the existence of dissent within the group.  
 For instance, in a study by Brodbeck et al. (2002) they observed that groups featuring dissent 
before deliberation shared more information during discussion. In another study, Schulz-Hardt et al. 
(2005) found that groups featuring dissent are more likely to arrive at a correct collective decision or 
judgment than homogenous groups—especially when someone in the group advocates the right 
solution—by, among other things, increasing discussion intensity and better pooling of the unshared 
evidence. Interestingly, they also established a correlation between pre-deliberation dissent and better 
collective outcomes and less shared information bias in groups where none of the members favored the 
right solution—e.g., groups like the high-profile members of the Bush administration disagreeing about 
the possible locations of Saddam Hussein’s WMDs or the tobacco company’s board of directors 
disagreeing about which evidence best proves that there is no causal link between smoking and lung 
cancer. Another study by Greitemeyer et al. (2006) further confirmed the positive effects of intragroup 
disagreement, this time with artificially fostered controversy within target groups. In their study, they 
implemented an advocacy procedure in which each group member acted as an advocate for each 
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alternative for some time independently of their individual preferences. This procedure resulted in an 
increased exchange of both unshared and shared information.  
Thus, if it is at the core of any deliberative process that private evidence is shared among group 
members and the very existence of intragroup disagreement is already a factor that cancels out (perhaps 
in combination with other factors we’ve seen) shared information bias, we have good reason to think 
that deliberating is an appropriate way to solve intragroup disagreement with the primary aim of settling 
on an evidentially supported collective view.  
4 Assessing for understanding  
Suppose that members of a group, G, aim to let p or else not-p stand as the group’s view only if it 
facilitates understanding. Understanding—at least, as it is typically discussed in epistemology—is a 
genus with (at least) two distinct species: (i) understanding-why (e.g., I understand why the house burnt 
down, I understand why Caesar crossed the Rubicon); and (ii) objectual understanding (I understand 
chemistry, I understand Australian Rules football). It is an open question how these two species are 
related. 
Moreover, it is a point of contention whether either of these species of understanding reduces 
to propositional knowledge, or to each other.25 For the present purposes, we will remain neutral on these 
points. One assumption we will make, however, is that understanding involves—in some suitably 
specified sense—grasping. In the case of understanding-why, what one grasps when one understands 
why something is so is the relation between the explanans and the explanandum. In the case of objectual 
understanding, what one grasps when one understands something, X, which can be treated as a subject 
matter, is the explanatory and coherence-making relations between propositions making up the relevant 
body of information (e.g., Kvanvig 2003, Ch. 8; Gordon 2017).  
In both cases, truth plays a constraining role, even if true beliefs don’t suffice for understanding 
of either variety. For example, you don’t understand why the house burnt down if the explanation you 
grasp is itself false—e.g., The house burnt down because of arson (false) versus The house burnt down 
because of faulty wiring (true). Likewise, in the case of objectual understanding, one doesn’t understand 
combustion even if one grasps the coherence and explanatory relations between the (mostly false) 
propositions making up phlogiston theory—and this is so even if one, by such grasping this body of 
information, understands, merely, the phlogiston theory of combustion. 
If true beliefs are necessary for understanding, why are they not sufficient? Here is the 
importance of grasping to understanding. A child might, for example, believe truly (e.g., via testimony 
from a parent) that the house burnt down due to faulty wiring without understanding why this is so, on 
account of failing to suitably grasp how the explanans relates to the explanandum. Likewise, one might 
fail to understand algebraic geometry even if one has memorized true axioms and formulae, if one fails 
to grasp how the relevant axioms and formulae hang together, e.g., by failing to grasp how the axioms 
and formulae are mutually supporting.  
Against this (albeit brief) background: let’s consider how voting and deliberation, respectively, 
fare as a means to achieving a group’s aim to let p or else not-p stand as the group’s view only if it 
facilitates understanding. For simplicity, we will focus on understanding why—using as a reference 
case the following: suppose the mayor of a city has appointed a committee to determine why city hall 
mysteriously burned to the ground in a fire. The two salient alternatives the committee are evaluating 
as the cause are faulty wiring and arson. Let ‘Case 1’ be a case where the group simply takes a vote 
(e.g., ‘yea’ for fire, ‘nay’ for arson), and let ‘Case 2’ be a case featuring deliberation. Which best 
facilitates understanding?  
Interestingly, there are two very different senses in which a vote or a deliberation vis-à-vis arson 
or faulty wiring might (broadly speaking) ‘facilitate’ understanding, which need to be separated. 
Suppose, for example, the mayor goes further to instruct the committee to not settle on a group view 
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(vis-à-vis arson or faulty wiring) until the group understands why the hall burnt down. In such a 
situation, the settled view should be made on the basis of a certain kind of epistemic credential, and 
regardless of whether taking that vote promotes the group’s understanding—e.g., regardless of whether 
reaching a settled view will itself help the group come to understand the cause of the fire, or to increase 
that understanding.  
On this interpretation of the understanding goal, merely voting will be inefficacious, and this is 
so even if voters antecedently meet voter competence and voter independence conditions, and thus, 
even if voting would further the truth aim. Deliberation by comparison does much better. Put another 
way, the probability that the group will be positioned to reach a verdict on the basis of understanding 
conditioned on deliberation is higher than on voting, even if it is not particularly high in cases where 
subjects prior to deliberation fail to meet competence and independence conditions. 
The rationale for why voting will do worse in comparison to deliberation (vis-à-vis the above 
interpretation of the understanding goal) is that the mere registering (by group members) that each 
member holds certain views [either the ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ view] is simply not the sort of thing that could 
ensure that a group grasps why something is so; deliberation, by contrast is. On this point, Kenneth 
Boyd’s (2019) analogy between a group’s physically grasping something and cognitively grasping 
something is helpful: 
[...] consider again the way in which individuals rely on one another in the case of physical 
group grasping: they rely on each other insofar as they are aware both that they must direct 
effort towards the same goal, and that if any other let go then they would not be able to pull 
their friend to shore safely on their own. In the epistemic case the situation is analogous: if the 
goal of the group is to understand (why/how/that) p, then members of the group are mutually 
p-reliant in the case that they recognize both that they are contributing towards the relevant goal 
(perhaps in the form of representing reasons and relationships between reasons), and that they 
would not be able to achieve that goal on their own (given the circumstances) (2019: 15-6). 
Boyd’s idea here is that kind of grasping that is germane to a group’s understanding something involves, 
necessarily, some kind of group reliance, viz., reliance between group members on each other's 
contributions toward the common goal, as well appreciation that each other's contributions is necessary. 
Mere voting in the absence of sharing evidence is a paradigmatic example of a non-reliant contribution 
to a common goal. If group members fail to understand why city hall burnt down prior to voting, so 
they will fail to understand why after voting, and will thereby simply register viewpoints that are 
reached unreliantly on other group members' influences. Deliberation, by contrast, offers at least the 
kinds of conditions that could make such reliance possible, especially when deliberation involves the 
sharing of evidence and reasons. 
 The above articulates the situation, at least, if the idea is that the settled view of the group 
should be made on the basis of a certain kind of epistemic credential—viz., understanding. Interestingly, 
with respect to the understanding goal, we end up with the same result (viz., deliberation beats voting) 
even if we reject that the settled view should be made on the basis of a certain kind of understanding 
and instead ask whether voting or deliberation better promotes the group’s understanding.  
 Voting does look, initially at least, as though it could promote understanding. Returning to our 
illustrative case of the committee appointed by the mayor to determine why city hall burned (viz., arson 
or fire): even if the committee simply takes a vote, with no deliberation whatsoever, group members, in 
virtue of their appreciation of what each other has voted, might gain some kind of intellectual traction 
on the situation. For example, if I am on the committee and antecedently think that other committee 
members satisfy a voter competence condition, then my coming to find out that there is a near-
unanimous vote favoring the arson explanation might lead me to think it’s more likely than not that it 
   
 
16 
was arson rather than faulty wiring. In fact, on the basis of simply gaining knowledge of this revealed 
voting distribution, I might even become highly epistemically justified in believing this.  
 However, no matter how high we raise my antecedent knowledge of the extent to which other 
voters on the committee satisfy a competence condition, and no matter how large the group size 
agreement is (e.g., no matter how many people there are on the committee whose votes align with the 
same explanation), it remains that the kind of intellectual improvement I might attain by simply learning 
what a voting pattern is, is going to fall short of understanding. The same, however, does not apply in 
the case of deliberation.  
 The argument for this is as follows. The first premise says that expert testimony does not suffice 
for individual-level understanding-why. This premise (defended in various places by Duncan Pritchard, 
e.g., 2009; 2014) gains support from the following kinds of cases. Suppose you want to understand why 
the dinosaurs went extinct, and you ask an expert paleontologist. The paleontologist is in a hurry and 
simply tells you that they went extinct because of an asteroid. You then come (in the absence of any 
undefeated defeaters for this expert testimony) to believe the proposition “the dinosaurs went extinct 
because of an asteroid”. While it is uncontentious (regardless of whether one is a reductionist or anti-
reductionist in the epistemology of testimony) that you can come to gain propositional knowledge on 
the basis of this kind of testimonial exchange, Pritchard’s line is that such testimony isn’t enough to 
secure understand-why given that (i) understanding-why requires a suitable grasp of the how the 
relevant cause and effect relationship, and (ii) such a grasp is not something one gains simply by 
accepting someone’s word, even an expert’s.  
 The second premise of the argument then draws an analogy between testimony from experts 
and testimony from intragroup members, where the latter is effectively what one gleans by coming to 
learn that there was a majority voting pattern in favor of one explanation (e.g., arson) over another. The 
claim is that if the former doesn’t suffice for understanding, then neither does the latter. That is: if expert 
testimony to the effect that some causal claim is true doesn’t suffice for understanding why that claim 
is true (even if it suffices to furnish justification or even knowledge), then neither will the testimony to 
the effect that some causal claim is true when the source of that testimony is an aggregation of voting 
choices by individuals one regards to be competent. Taken together, the two premises imply that mere 
voting is not going to facilitate group understanding-why—or, at least, not any more than mere expert 
testimony facilitates understanding why.  
 It’s worth noting of course that deliberation is importantly different from mere voting in exactly 
the kind of respect in which mere voting was shown to (like relying on testimony) be incapable of 
engendering understanding-why. This is because when a group deliberates about why something, X, is 
so, the sharing of evidence (and indeed, in some cases, the critical discussion of shared evidence) 
engages with not merely the matter of what caused X (e.g., arson caused the fire, an asteroid caused the 
dinosaurs’ extinction, etc.), but how it did so. For example, the mayor-appointed committee, upon 
sharing evidence, will discuss such things as whether the building had enough flammable material to 
have burnt simply through a burning wire, what an arsonist would have had to do to have brought about 
the fire in the way it was brought about, etc. Such considerations are, of course, exactly the thing that 
(à la Pritchard) one would have to have some command of if one is to grasp the connection between 
the relevant cause and effect. And, moreover, by relying on one another for such considerations (and 
not merely for the verdicts), group members are grasping an explanation as a group in a way that is (à 
la Boyd) analogous to the way a group might physically grasp something together.  
Bringing this all together: we’ve seen in this section that there are two ways we might plausibly 
measure the effectiveness of voting as opposed to deliberation in light of the epistemic aim of 
understanding. The first way is to ask which is more effective if the objective is for the group to reach 
a settled view about why X only if the group understands why X. The second is to ask which is more 
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effective if the objective is to promote the group’s understanding. In both cases, we’ve seen (for 
different reasons) that deliberation outperforms mere voting.  
5 Assessing for epistemic justice 
Thus far, we’ve been considering how voting versus deliberation fare with respect to the following 
kinds of goal-conduciveness: truth, evidence, and understanding. Each of these goals is a traditional 
epistemic goal. 
As recent work in social epistemology has shown, there are important connections between 
epistemic goals and social power and pressures, connections which can give rise to what Miranda 
Fricker (2007) terms epistemic injustice. Put generally, an injustice to someone is an epistemic injustice 
if it involves their being wrongfully disadvantaged in their capacity as an epistemic subject (e.g., a 
potential knower). A central species of epistemic injustice is testimonial injustice, for example, when 
prejudice leads a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word.26 In a group setting, 
we might imagine, for instance, a female or minority juror’s viewpoint being disregarded on the basis 
of sexist prejudice or, more subtly, being accepted but being given less weight than the viewpoint of an 
equally or less competent male juror. 
Given the prevalence of these kinds of prejudices and the epistemic harms they lead to, one 
kind of epistemic value which groups might aspire to in settling the matter is to settle it in a way that 
mitigates, or is free from, epistemic injustices to individual members of the group. More precisely, let 
us suppose that a group adopts the following aim:  to let p or else not-p stand as the group’s view only 
if their doing so does not wrong any member specifically in her capacity as an epistemic subject (e.g., 
as a giver of knowledge, in her capacity for social understanding, and so on) or any other person outside 
the group in that capacity. Such a group, for short, adopts the aim of epistemic justice.  
Of course, a group’s aiming to issue an epistemic just verdict does not in any way preclude 
aiming at other epistemic goods, and in fact, it would be natural to expect that this aim will generally 
be paired with other aims. For example, a group might combine this aim with the aim of truth. In which 
case, the group aims to let p or else not-p stand as the group’s view only if (i) p or else not-p is true; 
and (ii)  their doing so does not wrong any member specifically in her capacity as an epistemic subject 
or any other person outside the group in that capacity.  
Does voting or deliberation better facilitate epistemic justice? Let’s begin by considering the 
following simple argument for voting: epistemic injustice (at least, of the testimonial variety of 
epistemic justice we’re interested in) depends on testimonial exchange. Voting, but not deliberation, 
forecloses the possibility of testimonial exchange; so, voting, but not deliberation, forecloses a condition 
on which testimonial injustice depends. Therefore, voting better facilitates epistemic justice—
specifically, by (unlike deliberation) blocking a condition necessary for its manifestation.  
If the above argument is sound, then it looks as though voting should be favored to deliberation 
on epistemic justice grounds, even if it turns out that deliberation beats voting with respect to other 
epistemic goals.  
Put perhaps there is space for the proponent of deliberation to press back along the following 
lines: even if deliberation is a precondition for epistemic injustice of the testimonial variety to occur, it 
remains that it is unlikely that testimonial injustice will occur in ordinary structured voting groups, e.g., 
such as juries, where there are norms in place already to give appropriate weight to individual 
viewpoints. For example, as this line of thought might go, juries are read instructions prior to 
deliberation that are meant to combat epistemically irresponsible assessment of the evidence, of which 
testimonial injustice is an instance. Likewise, other groups, particularly those with internal decision 
procedures that are structured around an office and a charter (Kallestrup 2016; cf., Pettit and Schweikard 
2006), specify within that charter the rules by which a group will proceed towards its (joint) aims. So 
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long as such rules demand a fair evaluation of evidence during deliberation, they will de facto block 
epistemic injustice. Or so the thought might go.  
The above reply is met with a rather straightforward counterreply. Empirical studies by Waters 
and Hans (2009) show how deliberation often does engender testimonial injustice in the case of juries 
(particularly those using unanimity rules), where the rules for evaluating evidence are, and 
paradigmatically so, meant to be impartial ones. What Waters and Hans (2009) found was that (in a 
study of 3500 jurors in four urban courts) 38% of juries contained at least one juror who succumbed to 
social pressure by voting along with the rest despite being such that they would have voted differently 
had they voted privately. (Waters and Hans 2009: 520) And, as Brian Hedden (2016) notes, such 
pressures are “likely to have a disproportionate impact on “low status” jurors, that is, females, members 
of minority ethnic groups, jurors with less education, jurors of low socioeconomic status, and the like” 
(2006: 7). Hedden reaches this conclusion on the basis of studies from, in particular, Christensen and 
Abbott (2000) and Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington (1983), which report findings that lower status jurors 
speak less, share less evidence, exert less influence, and are less likely to be elected as a jury foreperson.  
These considerations support a presumptive case for thinking that deliberation will be positively 
correlated with epistemic injustice in a way that mere voting will not. However, even if this is granted, 
the proponent of deliberation has a card still to play: perhaps even if deliberation leads to epistemic 
injustice through the kinds of mechanisms described, it also facilitates at the same time epistemic 
justice—viz., perhaps deliberation is on the whole more epistemically just than it is unjust, even 
granting the kinds of considerations Hedden draws attention to.  
One attempt to advance this kind of an argument draws from considerations about the 
procedural value of deliberation. According to Fabienne Peter (2013), there is a procedural epistemic 
value to deliberation which does not simply reduce to the epistemic value deliberation might have in so 
far as it brings about epistemic values such as truth, knowledge, etc.. The idea is as follows: deliberation 
(particularly when it involves epistemic peers), brings about relationships of mutual accountability, 
relationships that are characterized by (among other things) a respect for epistemic equality among 
group members. As Peter (2013) puts it:  
deliberative parties who count each other as peers ought to recognize each other as such. It is 
then not permissible to give extra weight to one’s own beliefs simply because they are one’s 
own. This condition ensures that the participants are each aware of their own fallibility and 
acknowledge the possibility that their own beliefs may be wrong while their peers might be 
correct [...] (2013: 1264) 
Peter emphasizes that the value of this kind of mutual accountability, which is grounded in respect for 
epistemic equality, along with a “willingness to enter deliberation and to explicate one’s beliefs; and 
[...] uptake” (2013: 1264), is procedural in that it does not “reduce to the value of its result” (2013: 
1263). So, for Peter, the procedural value that mutual accountability adds to a correct group stance (e.g., 
p) is not ‘swamped’ by the value of that group’s correct stance that p. 
There are two worries for this argument. The first has to do with the swamping claim. It is not 
clear, without further argument, why the procedural value of Peter-style mutual accountability, in so far 
as this procedural value is meant to be epistemic (as opposed to, say, moral) is not simply swamped by 
the value of an epistemic end such as accuracy, truth, etc., toward which mutual accountability 
contributes. Second, the matter of how we ought to regard individuals we take to be epistemic peers 
and how we in fact are likely to treat such individuals can come apart. For example, even if juries ought 
to exhibit mutual accountability, it is a separate question whether they are inclined to meet this 
normative demand. The kinds of results Hedden draws attention to indicate that this normative demand 
is, in practice, often not met.  
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A proponent of deliberation might lean back, at this point, to a final kind of consideration: mere 
voting, absent deliberation, is a form of silencing (e.g., Barrett forthcoming; cf., Tanesini 2019; Langton 
1993), in that one’s assertions of one’s reasons are de facto suppressed via the denial of the opportunity 
for any kind explanation of one’s position. This silencing is injust, epistemically, in so far as it is 
suppressive; it suppresses one’s capacity to justify her view— capacity that might arguably be viewed 
as a kind of epistemic right (e.g., Watson 2018)—as well as the possibility of having any such 
justification make a difference. The argument then proceeds as follows: the epistemic injustice of 
silencing through mere voting is a greater epistemic injustice than the kind of testimonial injustice 
brought about by deliberation.  
While there is some intuitive pull to this line of thinking, it’s not clear that it ultimately holds 
up. The reasoning is as follows: even if we grant that mere voting is a form of silencing, it is unclear 
that silencing is unjust, at least, in so far as it involves the de facto suppression of an opportunity to 
explain one’s view. The thesis that a denial of the opportunity to explain or justify one’s view (whenever 
one is permitted to register that view) constitutes unjust silencing overgeneralizes such as to generate 
the result that almost all standard presidential and political voting in liberal democracies involves unjust 
silencing. Secondly, beyond the overgeneralization worry, there is a further reason to resist thinking 
that that mere voting involves any epistemically unjust form of silencing. The argument is that whether 
or not a given restriction on the extent to which one may justify her view is unjust is context dependent. 
In the context where a group’s views must all be taken into account, a better example of unjust silencing 
is disenfranchisement as opposed to voting in the absence of a capacity to provide additional reasons. 
And this is so even if the suppression of the opportunity to justify one’s view does constitute unjust 
silencing in the context of a parent-teacher meeting, or a criminal trial. 
In summary, we’ve seen in this section that epistemic justice is an epistemic aim that a group 
might reasonably adopt, along with any other epistemic aim (or set of epistemic aims), in its endeavor 
to settle a group view. With respect to this aim, deliberation was shown not only to be a precondition 
for a central species of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice—but further, that there are reasons to 
expect that deliberation will in fact—and regularly does—contribute to this form of injustice in practice 
(Hedden 2016). In response to this worry for deliberation, we looked at whether the positive procedural 
value brought about by deliberation might compensate for this epistemic injustice (Peter 2013), and 
concluded in the negative. Finally, we considered whether there might be an epistemically pernicious 
form of silencing (Barrett forthcoming) that is brought about by mere voting that might be in itself a 
kind of epistemic injustice that is more serious than what is engendered by deliberation, and the 
argument for this suggestion was ultimately unconvincing. With respect to the aim of epistemic justice, 
then, it looks as though voting is going to be more efficacious than deliberation.  
6 Ways to mitigate the epistemic disadvantages of deliberative intragroup disagreement  
In this section, we will address the deliberation question—recall: what it would take to overcome or at 
least mitigate the epistemic disadvantages of solving intragroup disagreement by means of deliberation? 
Given the pluralist approach to deliberation that we have adopted in this paper, namely that a group’s 
collective endeavor to solve an internal dispute can be aimed at different (albeit not necessarily 
incompatible) epistemic goals, it comes as no surprise that this question has no unique answer. To put 
it differently, for each epistemic goal a divided group might aim to when settling on a collective view, 
there are specific deliberative conditions that can make that view fail to satisfy that goal. Indeed, for 
some such goals we have concluded that deliberation is not, after all, an epistemically appropriate 
procedure for groups to solve their internal disputes. 
 This doesn’t mean, of course, that there is nothing groups can do to overcome the epistemic 
shortcomings of deliberative processes. To put things into perspective, let us briefly summarize our 
main conclusions on deliberation for the four epistemic goals we have considered and, on that basis, 
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and also on the basis of empirical results, provide some answers to the deliberation question for each of 
the goals. 
6.1 The truth and the evidence goals: the epistemic significance of being divided  
Concerning the truth goal, we have seen—drawing on social choice theory—that deliberating vis-à-vis 
the goal of reaching true collective agreements is roughly as epistemically appropriate as voting by 
majority rule in relatively idealized conditions (this is the result of Hartmann and Rafiee Rad’s Bayesian 
model of deliberation). However, we have also seen—drawing on empirical social psychology—that 
real-life deliberative situations may involve an array of factors that bear on the reliability of deliberation. 
Among those factors, two phenomena that operate at the group level constitute two particularly 
significant threats to the reliability of deliberation: group polarization and shared information bias. We 
have also seen, however, that these two reliability-undermining phenomena lose their influence in 
groups featuring internal disagreements (albeit perhaps not to the point of disappearing).   
This results in a rather paradoxical situation: groups whose members would only settle their 
internal disagreements if the resulting settled views were true can more reliably achieve this goal when 
their disagreements are pronounced. To put it differently, groups whose members are starkly divided 
over some issue (e.g., with a 50/50 distribution) might be in a more solid epistemic position to avoid 
such reliability-undermining phenomena and thus to solve their internal disputes reliably than groups 
that feature less pronounced disagreements.  
Groups can intensify their internal disputes in a number of ways. By way of illustration, a group 
of 100 members such that, e.g., 99 hold the false proposition p, whereas one holds that not-p might 
avoid or mitigate reliability-undermining group phenomena such as group polarization or shared 
information bias (i) by increasing the number of members who defend not-p,27 (ii) by making some 
members play the devil’s advocate role in defense of the minority view;28 or (iii) by implementing the 
previously discussed advocacy procedure, tested by Greitemeyer et al. (2006), according to which each 
group member acts as an advocate for each alternative for some time independently of their individual 
preferences.  
As we have seen in previous sections, increased disagreement within the group (e.g., by means 
of the just-mentioned advocacy procedure) results in better pooling of the evidence—including the 
group members’ private evidence—, which raises the chances that the collectively accepted view is 
supported by the best evidence available within the group, which would satisfy the evidence goal.  
Accordingly, one answer to the deliberation question could be the following: the very fact of 
being internally divided makes groups featuring internal disagreements be more protected from group 
phenomena that make it less likely that they solve their internal disagreements in such a way that they 
meet the truth and the evidence goals.  
Of course, this might not be enough for deliberation to be conducive to such goals and there 
are certainly more things that groups can do to ensure a better pooling of the evidence and increased 
accuracy—such as involving team leaders and members with experience at the relevant task in the 
deliberative process, giving enough time for discussion or having direct access to the evidence (as we 
have seen in §3). The bottom line, at any rate, is this: what might be considered a disadvantage for many 
reasons—viz., that a group is internally divided over some issue—turns out to be an epistemic 
advantage when the group aims to solve such a dispute by means of deliberation with an eye on reaching 
a true and evidentially well-supported collective agreement. 
6.2. The understanding goal: individual competence and the explanatory value of the evidence 
We have offered two interpretations of the understanding goal. On the first interpretation, members of 
a group would only let a view stand as the group’s view if the settled view is made on the basis of the 
group’s understanding; on the second interpretation, only if it promotes the group’s understanding. We 
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have argued, in both cases, that deliberation is superior to voting. However, this doesn’t mean that 
deliberation is always epistemically appropriate. 
 Consider the first interpretation of the goal. When group members are individually incompetent, 
it is unlikely that they will grasp the relevant issue in the way required by the goal. Accordingly, one 
way in which a group can mitigate this shortcoming is by increasing the individual competence of its 
members. This can be done in several ways. For example, changes can be made to group membership, 
and incompetent members be excluded from the group, or perhaps, only, from discussion. Another way 
is to ensure that internal or external experts explain the relevant subject matter to incompetent group 
members. 
Consider now the second goal, for example, in the case of understanding-why. We’ve argued 
that one epistemic advantage of deliberation over voting is that the sharing of evidence engages with 
not merely the matter of what, e.g., caused X, but how it did so, which better contributes to reaching the 
goal of promoting understanding among group members. However, whether or not deliberation is 
capable of this does not only depend on the sharing of the evidence, but also on its explanatory value. 
Not all evidence is equally explanatory, where this might depend on several factors. For 
example, sharing with one’s group a newspaper article on why SARS-CoV-2 is as infectious as it is is 
not as explanatory as sharing the specific studies that pin down the particular transmission channels. In 
some cases, by contrast, e.g. when group members are not particularly competent or lack the relevant 
expertise, sharing less detailed information might facilitate that they grasp the relevant issue more easily 
than sharing very detailed information they are in no position to understand. Sometimes, it is the amount 
of evidence, not just its quality, that matters for its explanatory value: sharing too much information 
with group fellows, even if high-quality, can lead to information overload, which rather than promoting 
group understanding may hinder it.  
In this way, two things groups can do to overcome or at least mitigate the epistemic limitations 
of deliberation vis-à-vis the understanding goal is to increase, first, the degree of individual competence 
of their members and, second, the explanatory value of the evidence, where this will depend, among 
other things, on increasing the quality of the information shared as well as on controlling the amount of 
information shared.  
One way to improve on both factors (individual competence and the explanatory value of the 
evidence) and thus to facilitate group understanding is to implement a method akin to the advocacy 
procedure discussed in §3—to our knowledge, this has not been empirically tested. In the advocacy 
procedure, each group member acts as an advocate for each alternative for some time independently of 
their individual preferences. In the method we envisage—call it the pedagogical procedure—, the 
competent members of the group (if any), or all members in groups of competent epistemic peers, act 
as pedagogues for the rest in the following way: all take care of explaining to fellow members the 
specifics of the collective views in dispute, in the best of their capacity and drawing on the best of their 
evidence. In cases where this policy cannot be applied, e.g., because no one in the group is competent, 
groups can resort to external experts who can give such a pedagogical service to group members. 
6.3 The epistemic justice goal: smaller discussion groups and computer-mediated communication  
Concerning the aim of epistemic justice, we’ve argued that deliberation is epistemically inappropriate 
for it in that deliberation is not only a precondition for testimonial injustice, but also regularly 
contributes to this form of injustice in practice. As empirical studies on juries have shown, deliberation 
puts social pressure on jurors to vote differently than if they had voted privately, makes lower status 
jurors speak less, share less evidence, exert less influence, and be less likely to be elected as a jury 
foreperson.29  
 One way in which participation can be enhanced during group discussion—thus minimizing 
the risk of testimonial injustice—is by reducing the size of the group (e.g., by splitting discussion into 
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smaller subgroups). As it turns out, the bigger the group, the more unequal participation is; and the 
smaller the group, the more equal it is (Bonito and Hollingshead 1997).  
In addition, since group members with lower status participate less and are less influential than 
those with higher status—which can no doubt lead to testimonial injustices if low status is allocated on 
non-epistemic grounds (e.g., prejudice, implicit bias)—, then one way to mitigate this epistemic flaw 
of deliberation is to prevent deliberators from accessing those cues that make them attribute status to 
other group members, including demographic cues such sex, race or age. Unsurprisingly, face-to-face 
communication makes such cues more readily accessible to deliberators, which can cause testimonial 
injustices more easily. By contrast, one way to make participation levels more equal—and thus mitigate 
testimonial injustice—is computer-mediated communication, which makes the cues that serve to 
allocate status private, at least in the short term until online group hierarchies emerge  (Hollingshead 
2001).30 
Concluding remarks 
Deliberation can be assessed from many angles. We have assessed it epistemically. In particular, we 
have investigated to what extent it is epistemically advantageous and disadvantageous that groups 
whose members disagree over some issue use deliberation in comparison to voting as a way to reach 
collective agreements. The way we have approached this question is from a pluralist perspective. We 
have assumed that a group’s collective endeavor to solve an internal dispute can be aimed at different, 
albeit not necessarily incompatible, epistemic goals, namely the goals of truth, evidence, understanding, 
and epistemic justice. For the goals of truth and evidence we have explained, drawing on social choice 
theory, that deliberation and voting are epistemically on a par. But we have also shown how complex it 
is to give a straightforward answer to the question of how reliable deliberation is as a method for solving 
intragroup disagreement. This complexity, we have argued, has to do with the interplay between the 
different kinds of evidence involved in deliberation as well as with several group phenomena widely 
investigated in empirical social psychology such as group polarization and shared information bias. 
Concerning the goal of understanding, we have given two interpretations of the goal (the goal of 
reaching a collective view about why X only if the group understands why X and the goal of reaching 
a collective view only if it promotes the group’s understanding). In both cases, we have argued, 
deliberation outperforms mere voting. Concerning the epistemic justice goal, however, we have 
concluded that voting is more efficacious than deliberation. Finally, we have discussed several ways to 
mitigate the potential epistemic disadvantages of solving intragroup disagreement by means of 
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1 Collective agreement is a gradable notion: the more members of a group G agree on p, the broader the 
collective agreement. When a collective agreement is complete (all members of G agree on p) or else when it is 
broad (many members of G agree on p), we call it ‘consensus’ (see Tucker 2003: 509-510 for the former view; 
Miller 2013 for the latter). For our purposes, the kind of collective agreement we are interested in need not be 
consensual, but sufficiently broad for the relevant view to be considered the group’s view. 
2 That members of a group agree to take a certain course of action, φ, as a group is a special case of letting a 
view stand as the group’s view, namely the view that the group will or ought to φ. 
3 Operative members are, according to Lackey, those who “have authority or power to determine certain 
outcomes for the group as a whole” (Lackey 2016: 350). In contrast, passengers are group members with no or 
little authority or power that simply go along with the resolutions and decisions of operative members (cf. 
Fricker 2010).  
4 For simplicity, we will not consider the third kind of view members of deliberative and non-deliberative 
groups might agree on to feature as the group’s view: suspension of judgment, i.e., neither endorsing p, nor not-
p.  
5 In §3, we will consider borderline cases of groups that are motivated by non-epistemic reasons but that 
nevertheless pursue epistemic goals.  
6 For discussion on how groups can aim at epistemic goals qua groups, see Fallis (2007). 
7 For a similar methodological approach to a different question (whether or not deliberation has procedural in 
addition to instrumental value), see Peter (2013: fn. 12)  
8 Epistemic justice, as a goal, is not purely epistemic: epistemic injustice, as Fricker (2007) conceives it, 
involves both epistemic and moral harm. Still, given the significance of this notion in recent epistemological 
theorizing, it is interesting to assess what kind of method to solve disagreement fares better with respect to it: 
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